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The  differentials,  or  spreads,  among  the  yields  of 
individual  U.  S.  government  bond  issues  vary  signifi- 
cantly  over  time.  This  variability  was  particularly 
noticeable  in  the  last  two  months  of  1976  and  the 
first  month  of  1977.  The  rapidly  changing  configu- 
ration  of  U.  S.  bond  yields  over  this  period  is  largely 
attributable  to  changes  in  the  tax  code  implemented 
by the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1976.  This  article  specifies 
the  determinants  of  U.  S.  bond  yield  spreads.  In 
particular,  these  spreads  are  explained  by  two  factors, 
referred  to  in  the  article  as  the  “capital  gains  effect” 
and  the  “flower  bond  effect.”  The  first  effect  occurs 
because  some  U.  S.  bonds  carry  coupons  well  below 
market  yields,  while  the  second  effect  occurs  because 
some  TJ.  S.  bonds  have  a  special  feature  enabling 
them  to  be  used  at  par  value  for  estate  tax  purposes. 
The  article  proceeds  as  follows.  First:  it  provides 
a  framework  for  analyzing  how  the  capital  gains  and 
flower  bond  effects  contribute  to  U.  S.  bond  yield 
spreads.  Then  it  reviews  the  impact  of  these  effects 
on  U.  S.  yield  spreads  from  the  mid-1960’s  to  tile 
passage  of  the  Tax  Reform  Act,  attempting  for  the 
latter  part  of  this  period  to  decompose  selected 
spreads  into  parts  attributable  to  the  two  effects. 
Lastly,  it  discusses  the  impact  of  the  1976  Tas  Ke- 
form  ..4ct  on  U.  S.  bond  yield  spreads. 
Factors  Contributing  to  IJ.  S.  Bond  Yield  Spreads 
As  of  the  beginning  of  this  year,  there  were  15  out- 
standing  U.  S.  bond  issues  maturing  or  callable  in 
10 years  or  more.  Six  of  these  issues  were  sold  prior 
to June  1963  and  have  coupons ranging  from  3 to 4% 
percent.  The  other  nine  were  issued  after  January 
1973  and  have  coupons  ranging  from  6%  to  8% 
percent.  This  article  focuses  on  a  representative 
sample  of  these  issues,  namely  the  3’s  of  95,  the  4ys’s 
1 This  article  is  adapted  from  a  section  of  [21. 
of  89-94,  and  the  Gg’s  of  93.  (The  first  number 
refers  to the  coupon  of the  bond  and  the  second  refers 
to  the  call  elate,  if  there  is  one,  and  maturity  date.) 
Chart  1 shows  the  movement  in  the  market  yields  of 
these  three  bonds  since  January  1973,  when  the 
6%‘~  of  93  were  first  issued.  Kot  only  are  there 
significant  differences  among  the  yield  levels,  but  the 
spreads  between  them  vary  substantially. 
Intuitively,  it  appears  paradosical  that  investors 
would  allow  yield  differentials  to  persist  on  bonds  of 
equal  quality  and  roughly  equal  maturity,  such  as 
those  shown  in  Chart  1.  The  explanation,  however, 
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series  are  before-tax  yield  series  generally  computed 
under  the  assumption  that  the  bond  is  held  to  ma- 
turity.2  In  this  framework  the  yield  is  the  discount 
rate  r  that  equates  the  bond’s  price  P  to  the  present 
value  of  the  future  cash  flows  associated  with  holding 
it.  If  a bond  with  a par  value  of $100  pays  a constant 
return  C  each  year  and  matures  in  N  years,  then  the 
yield  is  determined  by  the  formula 
s 
(1)  PI  c  c  - 
n=l  (l+r)”  + 
100 
(l+r)” 
The  formula  has  two  aspects  that  contribute  to 
spreads  between  U.  S.  bond  yields.  First,  it  calcu- 
lates  a  before-tax  yield  when  in  fact  the  relevant 
yield  to  an  investor  is,  abstracting  from  risk  con- 
siderations,  the  after-tax  yield  that  equates  the  price 
of  a  bond  to  the  present  value  of  the  future  after-tax 
returns.  Income  accruing  to  long-term  bonds  is 
alternatively  subject  to  the  relevant  marginal  income 
tax  rate,  to  the  capital  gains  tax  rate,  or  in  some 
cases,  to  no  tax  rate.  Consequently,  a  wide  range  of 
before-tax  yields  can  provide  the  same  after-tax  yield. 
The  price  of  a  bond  that  is  “seasoned”  (i.e.,  old  or 
outstanding)  will  deviate  from  its  par  value  in  order 
to  keep  the  yield  in  line  with  current  market  yields. 
In  particular,  a  bond  with  a  coupon  below  current 
market  yields  will  sell  at  a  discount  (price  below 
par)  in  order  to  raise  the  yield  to  a  level  equivalent 
to  that  of  comparable  newly-issued  bonds.  For  such 
a  discount  bond,  the  after-tax  yield  r*  is  determined 
by  the  formula 
where  t  is  the  marginal 
(loo-P)(l-cg)  +  P 
(l+rr)x  (1$-r*)” 
income  tax  bracket  of  the 
investor,  and  cg  is  the  tax  rate  on  long-term  capital 
gains.3  The  interest  income  C is  taxed  at  the  relevant 
personal  income  or  corporate  income  tax  rate,  while 
the  capital  gain  at  maturity  ($100--P)  is  taxed  at 
the  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate. 
A  low  coupon  seasoned  U.  S.  bond  selling  at  a 
discount  will  require  a  lower  before-tax  yield  than  a 
2 The  effects  on  observed  yield  differentials  of  call  provisions,  default 
risk,  and  tax  treatment  are  discussed  in  the  context  of  the  Yield-to- 
maturity  formula  in  Cl]. 
3The  formula  is  more  complicated  for  a  bond  selling  at  a  price 
greater  than  its  par  value  because  the  investor  has  the  option  of 
accepting  a  capital  loss  at  maturity  or  annually  taking  part  of  the 
premium  paid  for  the  bond  as  a  deduction  against  current  interest 
income. 
new  issue  bond  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  tax  rate 
applied  to  the  long-term  capital  gain  at  maturity  of 
the  discount  bond  is  below  the  marginal  tax  rate. 
Second,  a  larger  part  of  the  tax  is  deferred  to  a  later 
period.  For  given  marginal  and  capital  gains  ta!x 
rates,  any  number  of  combinations  of  coupons  and 
before-tax  yields  as  calculated  by  formula  1  w:ill 
provide  the  same  after-tax  yield  as  calculated  by 
formula  2. 
The  second  aspect  of  formula  1 that  contributes  to 
spreads  among  U.  S.  government  bond  yields  is  the 
assumption  that  the  bond  is  held  to  maturity.  This 
assumption  may  not  hold  for  an  important  class  of 
bonds,  namely  those  that  are  redeemable  at  par  valzle 
for  estate  tax  purposes  regardless  of  their  market 
value.  These  bonds  are  often  purchased  with  the 
expectation  that  they  will  be  retired  well  before 
maturity.  If  such  a  bond  is  purchased  at  a  discount, 
the  expected  yield  rises  as  the  expected  ho1din.g 
period  declines,  because  the  capital  gain  when  the 
bond  is  retired  is  spread  over  a  shorter  period  of time. 
U.  S.  bonds  redeemable  at  par  for  estate  tax  pur- 
poses  are  widely  and  irreverently  called  “flower” 
bonds  because  of  the  association  between  flowers  and 
funerals.  In  addition  to  their  par  value  redeem- 
ability,  these  bonds  had  a  second  notable  feature 
prior  to  the  1976  Tax  Reform  Act.  Under  then- 
existing  tax  law,  beneficiaries  computed  the  gain  or 
loss  on  inherited  property  on  the  basis  of  the  fai.r 
market  value  of  the  property  on  the  date  of  the 
decedent’s  death.  In  the  case  of  flower  bonds, 
this  value  was  the  par  value  of  the  bond.  Conse- 
quently,  no  capital  gains  tax  had  to  be  paid  on  the 
difference  between  the  purchase  price  and  the  par 
value  of  the  bond.  (The  capital  gain  was  not  com.- 
pletely  tax  free,  however,  since  it  became  part  of  the 
decedent’s  estate  and  was,  therefore,  subject  to  estate 
taxation.)  In  summary,  prior  to  the  recent  changes 
in  the  tax  code,  flower  bonds  used  for  estate  tax 
purposes  had  two  features  that  lowered  their  before:- 
tax  yield-to-maturity  as  calculated  by  formula  1. 
First,  they  provided  relatively  tax-free  capital  gains. 
And  second,  because  they  were  discount  bonds,  their 
relatively  short  expected  holding  period  raised  their 
expected  yield. 
For  completeness,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  third 
factor,  length  of  time  to  maturity,  can  also  contribut,e 
to  differentials  between  U.  S.  government  bond 
yields.  This  factor  is  relatively  unimportant,  how- 
ever,  for  bonds  that  have  a  maturity  of  15  years  or 
longer,  such  as  those  considered  in  this  article; 
therefore  it  is  ignored. 
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the  latter  half  of the  1960’s  and  the  early  1970’s,  vir- 
tually  all  long-term  U.  S.  government  bonds  had  two 
characteristics  that  affected  their  relative  yields. 
First,  they  carried  coupons  below  current  market 
yields  and,  as  a  result,  sold  at  prices  below  their  par 
values.  This  occurred  because  as  yields  in  the  mid- 
1960’s  rose  above  the  Congressionally-legislated  4% 
percent  interest  rate  ceiling  on  new  Treasury  bonds, 
the  Treasury  was  unable  to  sell  new  issues.  When 
market  yields  continued  to  rise  in  the  late  1960’s, 
the  discount  on  outstanding  U.  S.  bonds  became 
progressively  larger. 
Because  they  were  selling  at  a  discount,  the  before- 
tax  yields  on  these  low  coupon  U.  S.  bonds  were 
depressed  relative  to  the  yields  on  new  issues  of 
taxable  bonds  in  other  sectors.  An  approximate 
measure  of  the  impact  of  a  low  coupon  on  a  bond’s 
before-tax  yield  can  be  derived  by  using  its 
before-tax  yield  series  to  construct  a  “new  issue 
equivalent”  yield  series  that,  given  marginal  and 
capital  gains  tax  rate  assumptions,  would  provide 
the  same  after-tax  yield.  Specifically,  the  after-tax 
yield-to-maturity  for  any  discount  bond  can  be  cal- 
culated  from  formula  2  after  making  marginal  and 
capital  gains  tas  rate  assumptions  and  using  the 
appropriate  coupon  and  maturity.-  The  after-tax 
yield  can  then  be  converted  into  its  corresponding 
new  issue  equivalent  by  the  formula 
The  effect  of  the  low  coupon  on  the  observed  yield 
series  is  then  calculated  as  the  spread  between  the 
reconstructed  new  issue  equivalent  and  the  original 
yield  series  for  the  low  coupon  bond.  This  spread 
is  a  measure  of  the  capital  gains  effect  on  the  low 
coupon  bond  yield.* 
Chart  2  shows  the  spread  between  the  new  issue 
equivalent  and  original  yield  series  for  the  4ys’s  of 
S9-91.  Corporate  marginal  and  capital  gains  tax 
rates  applicable  in  each  period  were  used  to construct 
the  new  issue  equivalent  yield  series.”  The  spread 
between  the  new  issue  equivalent  and  original  yield 
series  rises  and  falls  with  the  level  of  interest  rates 
*It  should  be  emphasized  that  this  procedure  is  valid  only  over  a 
period  when  the  low  coupon  bond’s  rieid  is  unaffected  by  the  fkwer 
bond  provision.  If  the  flower  bond  provision  is  pulling  down  the 
low  coupon  bond’s  yield,  thereby  decreasing  the  differential  between 
its  yield  and  coupon,  the  estimate  of  the  capital  e;ains  effect  calcu- 
lated  in  the  manner  described  here  will  be  biased  downward. 
“It  is  armed  in  [Z]  that  the  corporate  tax  rates  are  appropriate 
rates  to  use  to  calculate  new  issue  equivalent  yields  for  low  coupon 
E.  S.  bonds  and  that  other  reasonable  assumptions  result  in  Ned 
issue  equivalent  yield  series  that  are  not  very  different  from  those 
derived  using  corporate  tax  rates.  L31  concludes  that  the  best  tax 
rate  assumptions  to  use  in  adjusxinr:  the  yields  on  low  coupon 
discount  bonds  are  slightly  lower  than  the  corporate  tax  rates. 
since  the  higher  the  interest  rate  level,  the  greater 
the  discount  ior  a bond  with  a fixed  low  coupon  and, 
hence,  the  grezer  the  capital  gain  at  maturity.  The 
spread  reached  a  peak  of  100  basis  points  in  May  of 
1970.  Consequently  , given  the  tax  rate  assumptions, 
the  capital  g&s  tax  effect  was  responsible  for  100 
basis  points  of  the  rise  in  the  spread  between  the 
observed  yields  on  newly-issued  bonds  and  the  yield 
on  the  45  percent  coupon  U.  S.  bond  over  this 
period.* 
The  second  characteristic  of  U.  S.  bonds  affecting 
their  before-tax  yields  over  this  period  was  that  vir- 
tually  all  of  them  could  be  used  for  estate  tax  pur- 
poses.  Of  these,  the  ones  actually  purchased  be- 
cause  of  this  feature  tended  to  be  the  lowest  coupon 
bonds,  such  as  the  3’s  of  95  and  the  3%‘~  of  98, 
which  were  setig  at  the  largest  discounts.  Evidence 
of  this  is  seen  in  the  table,  which  shows  the  amount 
of  six  flower  bond  issues  outstanding  at  the  end  of 
each  year  from  1965  through  1976.  The  net  decline 
from  year  to  year  is  a  measure  of  the  amount  used 
for  estate  tax  pcrposes.  The  amount  outstanding  of 
the  3’s  of  95  declined  steadily  throughout  the  period, 
and  the  amonE:  outstanding  of  the  3%‘~  of  98  de- 
clined  steadily  beginning  in  the  late  1960’s.  There 
was  no  decline  In the  amount  outstanding  of the  4jd’s 
of  87-92,  the  IT/s’s  of  89-94,  and  the  4’s  of  88-93 
until  1971,  ho\\-ever, and  the  decline  was  extremely 
small  until  19% 
B  In  actualitu,  the  -s?read  between  new  issue  prime  corporate  rates 
and  the  market  rielti  of  the  4+$‘s  of  89-94  rose  by  more  than  200 
basis  pains  throu&  mid-1970. 
other  factors  such 
It  is  argued  in  [Zl.  however,  that 
as  differential  call  risk  and  default  risk  can 
explain  the  additional  rise  in  the  spread. 
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1 
Sohe:  See  Chart  1.  _1  I 
Chart  3  shows  the  spread  between  the  market 
yields  of  the  4%‘~  of  89-94  and  the  3’s  of  9.5.  The 
spread  widened  considerably  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
1960’s.  Part  of  the  rise  can  be  attributed  to  the 
greater  capital  gains  effect  on  the  yield  of  the  lower 
coupon  3’s  of 95.  Most  of the  rise,  however,  occurred 
because  the  flower  bond  provision  had  a much  greater 
depressing  influence  on  the  yield  of  the  3’s  of  95 
than  on  the  yield  of  the  4%‘~  of  89-94.  In  fact,  the 
argument  can  reasonably  be  made  on  two  grounds 
that  the  yield  of  the  4%‘~  of  89-94  (and  similar 
coupon  bonds)  was  affected  very  little  by  the  flower 
bond  provision  over  this  period.  First,  the  evidence 
on  outstanding  flower  bonds  in  the  table  indicates 
that  there  was  relatively  little  demand  for  the  4%‘~ 
AMOUNT  OF  FLOWER  BONDS  OUTSTANDING 
of  89-94  (and  similar  coupon  bonds)  related  to  their 
flower  bond  provision  through  the  early  1970’s.  Sec- 
ond,  when  new  high  coupon  bonds  (6vh  percent  or 
higher)  were  issued  again  in  the  1970’s,  the  differ- 
entials  between  their  yields  and  the  yield  of  the  476’s 
of  89-94  could  initially  be  fairly  well  explained  by 
the  capital  gains  effect  alone. 
U.  S.  Bond  Yield  Spreads  From  1973  Through 
Late  1976  In  the  early  1970’s  two  developments 
occurred  that  were  to  affect  significantly  the  spreads 
among  U.  S.  government  bond  yields.  First,  the  4% 
percent  ceiling  on  new  U.  S.  bond  issues  was  lifted 
to  permit  the  issue  of  some  high  coupon  bonds  at 
current  yields.  Second,  effective  March  1971,  Con- 
gress  eliminated  the  extension  of  flower  bond  privi- 
leges  on  new  U.  S.  bond  issues,  thereby  insuring  a 
steadily  declining  stock  as  outstanding  issues  pur- 
chased  for  estate  tax  purposes  were  retired  over  time. 
The  table  shows  the  decline  in  the  stock  of  flower 
bonds  in  recent  years. 
The  presence  of  newly-issued  high  coupon  U.  S. 
bonds  in  the  1970’s  makes  it  possible  to  get  a  more 
precise  measure  of  the  impact  of  the  flower  bond 
provision  on low  coupon  U.  S.  bond  yields  by  decorn- 
posing  the  spread  between  the  yields  of a high  coupon 
bond  and  a  seasoned  low  coupon  bond  into  the  part 
attributable  to  the  capital  gains  effect  and  the  part 
attributable  to  the  flower  bond  provision  of  the  low 
coupon  bond.  The  capital  gains  effect  can  be  calcu- 
lated  as  follows.  First,  the  after-tax  yield  of  a  high 
coupon  bond  is  calculated  using  formula  2.  Second, 
using  formulas  1  and  2,  the  before-tax  yield  for  a 
specific  low  coupon  bond  is  constructed  that  provides 
the  Same  after-tax  yield  as  the  high  coupon  bond. 
($  millions) 
1965 
3’h’s  of  90  4900 
4%‘~  of  87-92  3818 
4’s  of  88-93  250 
4%‘~  of  89-94  1560 
3’s  of  95  2207 
3H’s  of  98  4413 
TOTAL  17148  16922  16678  16414  16055  15590 
1966  1967 
4894  4885 
3817  3817 
250  249 
1560  1559 
2006  1801 








1969  1970  1971  1972  --  -- 
4819  4727  4537  4262 
3814  3809  3794  3765 
249  248  245  240 
1558  1554  1543  1514 
1408  1253  1108  959 
4207  3999  3706  3365 
Note:  End-of-year  data  for  all  flower  bonds  with  a  maturity  of  1990  or  later. 
SOWCe:  Treasury  Bulletin. 
14933  14105 
1973  1974  1975  --- 
4018  3750  3545 
3695  3605  3490 
230  224  220 
1470  1384  1312 
851  757  692 
3132  2901  2652 
13396  12621  11911  1033,8 
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6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1977 Third,  the  differential  between  the  high  coupon  bond 
before-tax  yield  and  the  constructed  low  coupon 
bond  before-tax  yield  is  calculated.  This  differential 
is  the  capital  gains  effect  on  the  spread  between  the 
high  and  low  coupon  bond  yields;  it  is  solely  attrib- 
utable  to  the  difference  in  coupons  of  the  two  bonds. 
If  the  low  coupon  bond’s  flower  bond  provision  is 
causing  additional  downward  pressure  on  the  low 
coupon  bond’s  yield,  this  yield  will  fall  below  the 
constructed  yield  that  provides  the  same  after-tax 
yield  as  the  high  coupon  bond.  The  difference  be- 
tween  the  constructed  yield  and  the  actual  low  coupon 
bond  yield  can,  therefore,  be  attributed  to  the  flower 
bond  provision  and  used  as  a  measure  of  the  flower 
bond  effect  on  the  low  coupon  bond’s  yield. 
Using  the  6%‘~  of  93  as  the  high  coupon  bond, 
Chart  4  shows  the  flower  bond  effect  on  the  yields 
of  the  3’s  of  9;  and  the  478’s  of  89-94.  The  chart 
shows  an  increase  in  the  flower  bond  effect  that  be- 
gins  in  1973  and  subsequently  rises  sharply.  This 
trend  is  similar  both  for  the  bonds  whose  yields  had 
,already  been  substantially  affected  by  the  flower 
bond  effect,  such  as  the  3’s  of  95  and  the  3%‘~  of 
98,  but  also  for  those,  such  as  the  4%‘~  of  89-94 
and  the  4%‘~  of  87-92,  whose  yields  had  previously 
been  affected  only  slightly.  According  to  the  esti- 
mates  in  the  chart,  the  flower  bond  effect  on  the 
observed  yield  of  the  3’s  of  95  rose  from  100  basis 
points  in  mid-1973 to  250  basis  points  in  September 
1976.  Over  the  same  period  the  flower  bond  effect 
on  the  yield  of  the  4%‘~  of  89-94  went  from  nil  to 
160  basis  points. 
Two  factors  account  for  the  sharp  increase  in  the 
impact  of the  flower  bond  effect  on  low-coupon,  deep- 
discount  bond  yields  over  this  period.  First,  the 
stock  of  flower  bonds  was  steadily  declining,  and  it 
was  widely  and  correctly  expected  that  there  would 
be  no  additions  to  the  supply  in  the  future.  This 
circumstance  alone  would  be  expected  to  lead  to 
ever-higher  premiums  on  flower  bonds.  It  was  rein- 
forced,  however,  by  rapid  rates  of  inflation,  which 
drove  up  the  value  of  estates.  Since  tax  laws  were 
not  changed  to  adjust  for  the  impact  of  inflation  on 
the  level  of estate  taxes,  the  demand  for  flower  bonds 
naturally  increased.  The  combination  of  decreasing 
supply  and  increasing demand  resulted  in  a  contin- 
ually  increasing  flower  bond  effect  on  the  yields  of 
low  coupon  U.  S.  bonds  through  the  third  quarter  of 
1976. 
U.  S.  Bond  Yield  Spreads  Since  Passage  of  the 
1976 Tax  Reform  Act  The  Tax  Reform  Act  of 
1976,  passed  in  October,  has  had  a  significant  effect 
on  U.  S.  government  bond  yield  spreads  through  its 
impact  on  the  demand  for  flower  bonds.  The  Tax 
Reform  Act  did not  explicitly  deal  with  flower  bonds. 
Thus,  bonds  that  were  redeemable  at  par  for  estate 
tax  purposes  retain  that  feature.  Nevertheless,  the 
Act  contained  a  provision  that  diminished  the  appeal 
of  flower  bonds.  As  indicated  earlier,  prior  to  the 
1976  Act  flower  bonds,  like  other  investments  pro- 
viding  capital  gains,  were  valued  as  inherited  prop- 
erty  at  their  fair  market  value  on  the  date  of  the 
decedent’s  death;  for  flower  bonds  this  value  was 
the  par  value  of  the  bond.  Consequently,  under  the 
old  tax  law  not  only  was  there  the  potential  of  a very 
rapid  capital  gain,  but  it  was  free  from  capital  gains 
tax. 
The  1976  Tax  Act  changed  the  tax  basis  for  in- 
herited  property  to  its  cost  to  the  decedent.  For 
certain  property,  such  as  flower  bonds,  beneficiaries 
may  increase  the  cost  basis  to  the  fair  market  value 
of  the  property  on  December  31,  1976.  Conse- 
quently,  under  the  new  law  the  difference  between  the 
par  value  of  the  flower  bond  used  for  estate  tax 
purposes  and  the  original  cost  or  market  value  at  the 
end  of  1976,  whichever  is  greater,  is  subject  to 
capital  gains  tasation.  The  extent  of the  capital  gains 
tax  is  a  complicated  matter  depending  on  the  indi- 
vidual’s  estate  tax. 
A  second  provision  of  the  Tax  Act  that  has  pos- 
sibly  decreased  the  attractiveness  of  flower  bonds  is 
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of the  holding  period  necessary  to apply  the  long-term 
capital  gains  tax  rate.  It  is  not  yet  clear  how  this 
will  affect  “deathbed”  purchases  of  flower  bonds 
which  were  a  common  but  somewhat  controversial 
matter  even  under  the  old  tax  law. 
The  flower  bond  effect  on  U.  S.  bond  yield  spreads 
diminished  greatly  following  passage  of  the  1976  Tax 
Reform  Act.  As  Chart  4  indicates,  the  flower  bond 
effect  on  the  low  coupon  yields  began  to  decline 
around  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Act.  The 
decline  in  the  flower  bond  effect  on  the  low  coupon 
U.  S.  yields  became  more  rapid  in  November  and 
December  and  accelerated  further  in  January.  In- 
terestingly,  the  changing  flower  bond  effect  prior  to 
January  was  not  widely  recognized  because  market 
yields  were  falling.  Thus,  yields  on  low  coupon 
flower  bonds  were  relatively  stable  over  this  period 
while  yields  on  high  coupon  U.  S.  bonds  were  falling 
sharply.  It  was  only  in  January,  when  increases  in 
the  yields  on  high  coupon  U.  S.  bonds  were  far  out- 
paced  by  increases  in  the  yields  on  low  coupon  bonds, 
that  the  impact  of  the  1976  Tax  Reform  Act  on 
flower  bond  yields  was  widely  recognized. 
From  October  1976  through  January  1977  the 
typical  decline  in  the  flower  bond  effect  on  low 
coupon  bond  yields  was  about  150  basis  points.  For 
the  4%‘~  of 89-94  (and  similar  coupon  bonds  such  as 
the  4%‘~  of  S7-9.2  and  the  4’s  of  88-93)  the  flower 
bond  effect  was  almost  wiped  out.  That  is,  as  of  the 
end  of  January  the  spreads  between  the  original 
before-tax  yields  of these  issues  and  the  yields  of high 
coupon  U.  S.  bonds  could  be  almost  completely  ex- 
plained  by  the  capital  gains  effect.  For  the  lowest 
coupon  bonds,  such  as  the  3’s  of  95  and  the  3@‘.s  of 
98,  the  flower  bond  effect  as  of  the  end  of  January 
still  accounted  for  about  100  basis  points  of the  differ- 
ential  between  the  before-tax  yields  on  these  bonds 
and  the  yield  on  high  coupon  bonds. 
It  should  be  noted  in  conclusion  that  the  capital 
gains  effect  and  the  flower  bond  effect  on  before-tax 
U.  S.  bond  yields  are  of  interest  not  only  to  investors 
but  also  to  researchers  who  use  before-tax  U.  S. 
bond  yield  series  in  studies  of  risk,  studies  of  interest 
rate  expectations,  and  studies  of  the  impact  of relative 
supplies  of  debt  on  yield  differentials.  These  yield 
series  are  frequently  used  with  the  implicit  assump- 
tion  that  investors  respond  to  before-tax,  rather  than 
after-tax,  yields.  Their  use,  without  proper  reg.ard 
for  the  impact  of  the  capital  gains  and  flower  bond 
effects  on  before-tax  yield  relationships,  can  be  highly 
nlisleading.T 
:  I21  discusses  several  studies  that  have  used  U.  S.  government  bond 
yield  series  without  regard  for  the  possible  impact  of  the  capital 
gains  and  flower  bond  effects  on  the  movement  of  the  series. 
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